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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the increasing effects of domestic and international media
piracy 1 on the international entertainment industry (primarily motion picture and
music companies), several countries have instituted increasingly stringent laws to
combat such infringement. The entertainment industry is generally classified as
businesses in the for-profit production, marketing, and distribution of creative

* University of Houston Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2011.
1
Piracy refers to the illegal duplication and distribution of sound and media recordings, and is
often used interchangeably with the term “bootleg” recording. See Clifford A. Congo, Drawing A
Distinction Between Bootleg And Counterfeit Recordings And Implementing A Market Solution
Towards Combating Music Piracy In Europe, 17 DICK. J. INT’L L. 383, 385 (1999).
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works such as music, film, books, theater, radio, television, and electronic
broadcasts. 2 Historically, the entertainment industry has protected the production
and dissemination of these copyrighted works through the legal remedies and
rights afforded to the owners of such intellectual property. 3
With the continued evolution of technology, the entertainment industry is
now forced to respond to the use and misuse of computer-delivered digital
entertainment and its uncontrolled distribution over the Internet. 4 Over the last
decade, authorized distributors of creative works primarily controlled the
reproduction of such media. 5 However, the revolution in Internet and digital
technologies has threatened the industry’s ability to regulate such reproduction and
distribution. 6 Thanks to advances in digital technology and the availability of
standard computer equipment, copying and high-quality reproductions are
available to almost anyone with a CD/DVD burner. 7 Additionally, the Internet has
afforded media pirates with an instantaneous and virtually unlimited distribution
channel for digital content at little to no cost.8
It is estimated that approximately 77.4% of North Americans have Internet
access, the highest percentage in the world. 9 Likewise, more than 398 million
Asians and upwards of 340 million Europeans have online access. 10 As evidenced
by the sheer number of worldwide Internet users, it is clear that “[t]he globalization
of the world via the Internet creates a global problem when it comes to copyright
law.” 11
It is estimated that annually more than $20 billion in copyrighted movies,
music, and other entertainment is lost to global piracy networks that are tolerated
or encouraged by countries like China, Russia, India, and even Canada. 12 The rate

2
See generally Busniessweek.com, Business Exchange, http://bx.businessweek.com/entertainment
industry/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
3
Copyright is a “property right in an original work of authorship . . . fixed in any tangible medium
of expression, giving the holder exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform or display the
work.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 337 (7th ed. 1999).
4
See Mark Tratos, The Impact of the Internet & Digital Media on the Entertainment Industry:
Entertainment on the Internet: The Evolution of Entertainment Production, Distribution, Ownership
and Control in the Digital Age, 896 PRACTICING L. INST.: PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 133, 137 (2007).
5
Id. at 138-39. The right to reproduce a creative work is considered the most fundamental
exclusive right protected by a copyright. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW
290 (Matthew Bender & Co. 3d ed. 1999).
6
See Tratos, supra note 4, at 137. The copyright holder’s reproduction rights and distribution
rights—which allow the copyright owner to make the first distribution of a protected work—is
infringed when music is uploaded and shared via the Internet without authorization. See LEAFFER,
supra note 5, at 309.
7
See Tratos, supra note 4, at 139.
8
Id.
9
InternetWorldStats.com, Internet Usage Statistics, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
(last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
10
Id.
11
Kelly Leong, ITUNES: Have They Created a System for International Copyright Enforcement,
13 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 365, 370 (2007).
12
Michael Cieply, Digital Piracy Spreads, and Defies a Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/07/business/media/07piracy.html.
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of digital media piracy is so prevalent in today’s society that entertainment
industry insiders estimate that only one in three music CDs and about one in
twenty music downloads are sold legitimately worldwide. 13 In 2002, the Motion
Picture Association of America estimated that between 400,000 and 600,000
movies were downloaded illegally each day. 14 That number was projected to triple
by 2010. 15
While several individuals and software companies (Napster, Kazaa, etc.)
have been held liable for their infringing activities, the online conduits that have
made piracy possible have remained blameless. 16 As this paper will illustrate, the
current anti-pirating laws, have not effectively neutralized the conduits through
which this pirated media is trafficked.
The purpose of this note is to examine and analyze the international struggle
and subsequent legal efforts taken by the United States and the European Union to
protect copyright in the digital age. This note takes the position that the current
measures employed by the United States and the European Union are not effective
in combating international media piracy. Additionally, this note emphasizes that
media piracy, also referred to as digital copyright infringement, is a global problem
that will only be eradicated through an international effort. Finally, this note will
evaluate the efficacy of current domestic and foreign legislation specifically
focused on preventing the Internet trafficking of pirated copyrighted works, and
the subsequent duties and liability of Internet Service Providers.
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. International Intellectual Property Organization
While countries develop new copyright laws in attempts to circumvent the
shifting landscape of digital media production, legal restrictions on media use and
distribution, such as digital rights management, 17 are being championed by global
heavyweights in the media and entertainment industries. 18 These international

13
Id. See also Sefano Vranca, Six Strategies To Protect Clients Against IP Theft, 15 NO. 1 INTELL.
PROP. STRATEGIST 1 (Oct. 2008) (stating that the U.S. portion of the global music market was estimated
at 60.7%, which translated into 13.2 billion illegal U.S. downloads annually).
14
Associated Press, MPAA Snooping for Spies, WIRED, July 22, 2002, http://www.wired.com/
news/politics/0,1283,54024,00.html.
15
Id.
16
See A & M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d. 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Universal Music Austl.
v. Sharman License Holdings, (2005) F.C.A. 1242 (Austl.) (holding that the Federal Court of Australia
issued a landmark ruling that Sharman Networks, the parent company of Kazaa, was itself not found
guilty of copyright infringement, but was guilty of “authorizing” Kazaa users to illegally swap and
download copyrighted songs).
17
Digital Rights Management, or DRM technology, can be used to control either the access to a
work or the use of a work. DRM systems controlling the use of a work might involve limitations on the
particular device on which the media can be played; whereas controlling access to a work can be limited
by password encryption. See Mark Tratos, The Impact of the Internet & Digital Media on the
Entertainment Industry, in 862 PRACTICING L. INST.: PATS., COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROP. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 129, 129-30 (2006).
18
See Natalie Brown, Media Piracy: Approaching IP from the South, ASS’N. FOR PROGRESSIVE
COMMC’NS, July 21, 2008, http://www.apc.org/en/news/access/all/media-piracy-approaching-ip-south.
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efforts have resulted in increasing restrictions on media consumption, with
stringent punishment for access to copyright protected materials and unauthorized
dissemination of information technologies across the globe. 19
1.

The World Intellectual Property Organization and the Berne
Convention

The world’s intellectual property (“IP”) is currently “protected” by a series
of international sentinel organizations, all of which are primarily under the
direction of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”). 20 WIPO is a
specialized agency of the United Nations. 21 This highly specialized branch of the
United Nations is dedicated to developing a balanced and accessible international
intellectual property system, focused on rewarding creativity, stimulating
innovation, and contributing to economic development, while safeguarding public
interest in intellectual property. 22
The WIPO Convention established the World Intellectual Property
Organization in 1967. 23 The member states of WIPO mandated the promotion and
protection of IP throughout the world through cooperation among states and in
collaboration with other international organizations. 24 WIPO is headquartered in
Geneva, Switzerland and currently has 184 member states. 25 The WIPO
Convention provides that membership is open to any state that: 1) is a member of
the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property, or of the Berne Union for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works; or 2) is a member of the United
Nations, or of any of the United Nations’ Specialized Agencies, or of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, or that is a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice; or 3) is invited by the WIPO General Assembly to
become a Member State of the Organization. 26
In 1996, the member states of the World Intellectual Property Organization
signed two international treaties relating to copyright law; the World Intellectual
Property Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPOCT”) and the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (“WPPT”), collectively known as the WIPO
Internet Treaties. 27 The WIPOCT provided additional protection for copyrighted

19

See id.
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14, 1967 (as
amended Sept. 28, 1979), available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/trtdocs_wo029.html.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
See WIPO.int, World Intellectual Property Organization Home, http://www.wipo.int/portal/
index.html.en (last visited Oct. 10, 2009).
26
Id.
27
See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPOCT”), Apr. 12, 1997, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, available at 1997 WL 447232; WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(“WPPT”), Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO DOC. NO. CRNR/DC/95, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/
pdf/trtdocs_wo034.pdf.
20
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works. 28 This was deemed necessary due to advances in information technology
and the Internet that had taken place since the formation of previous copyright
treaties. 29 Specifically, the Internet Treaties prohibited the circumvention of
technological protections placed on copyrighted works, thereby allowing rights
holders to prosecute individuals who attempted to bypass such safeguards. 30
Additionally, the treaties explicitly granted copyright owners the exclusive right to
place their works on the Internet. 31
With its origin dating back as far as 1883, the Berne Convention is the
“oldest international treaty in the field of copyright.” 32
The Berne Convention, 33 the predecessor to the WIPOCT, required its
signatories to recognize the copyright of works of authors from other signatory
countries in the same way they recognized the copyright of their own nationals. 34
In addition to establishing a system of equal treatment that internationalized
copyright amongst signatories, the Convention also required member states to
provide strong minimum standards for enforcing and protecting copyright law. 35
The Berne Convention, similar to the Paris Convention which pertains to
patent rights, was created as a reaction to the lack of a harmonized international
standard for copyright enforcement and protection. 36 Since its creation, “the Berne
Convention has undergone numerous revisions to modernize its parameters in
accordance with changes in technology and other mediums of copyright.” 37 In
spite of changes made to the Convention over the past century, its main tenet “to
protect, in as effective and uniform a manner as possible, the rights of authors in

28

WIPOCT, supra note 27.
See WIPO.int, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html (showing that as of September 2008 there are
164 countries that are parties to the Berne Convention).
30
See Leong, supra note 11, at 373.
31
Id.
32
See Monlux, infra note 36, at 146-47.
33
The Berne Convention is based on three main principles:
First, there is an element of ‘national treatment’ that requires assurances of
similar protection to works that originate from different member states. Second,
members afford immediate protection to works originating out of member states
without any necessary formalities. Finally, there is an ‘independence of
protection,’ meaning that protection of the work is not dependent on the degree
of protection afforded the work in its originating country. Under this
protectionist umbrella, the Berne Convention specifies the works it protects,
rights of copyright owners, types of persons protected, and minimum standards of
protection.
Id. at 148.
34
The minimum standards for copyright protection, established by the Berne Convention, allowed
member nations to create national enforcement procedures but required the enforcement of such
procedures regardless of the nationality of the author. See Eleanor Lackman, Slowing Down the Speed
of Sound: A Transatlantic Race to Head Off Digital Copyright Infringement, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1161, 1184 (2003).
35
Id.
36
Nicholas R. Monlux, Copyright Piracy On The High Seas of Vietnam: Intellectual Property
Piracy In Vietnam Following WTO Accession, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 135, 147 (2009).
37
Id.
29
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their literary and artistic works,” has remained constant. 38
2. World Trade Organization, GATT, and TRIPS
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is a group of countries focused on
“breaking down trade barriers and increasing the free flow of commodities
between countries,” in order to liberalize free trade. 39 In furtherance of its
mission, the WTO promotes policies that encourage the “unrestricted flow of
goods and services,” thereby “sharpen[ing] competition . . . [and] multiply[ing] the
rewards that result from producing the best products, with the best design, at the
best price.” 40 With respect to intellectual property, the WTO creates standards that
apply to copyrights and patents, and requires that imported and local goods be
treated equally. 41
Following the adoption of the WIPO Internet Treaties in 1996, the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) provision of the
multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) gained
prominence among the members of the WTO. 42 TRIPS is an international
agreement administered by the WTO that establishes minimum standards for the
regulation of multiple types of intellectual property. 43
TRIPS specifically contains requirements that the laws of WTO member

38

Id.
Id. at 143 (stating that “[t]he WTO specifies procedures and policies on international commerce
to ‘help trade flow as freely as possible’”).
40
World Trade Organization, The Case for Open Trade, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
41
See WTO.org, Principles of the Trading System, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/what
is_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). According to the WTO, “[i]mported and locallyproduced goods should be treated equally--at least after the foreign goods have entered the market. The
same should apply to foreign and domestic services, and to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights and
patents.” Id.
42
See Leong, supra note 11, at 372.
43
See SociologyIndex.com, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
available at http://sociologyindex.com/agreement_on_trips.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2010). For
example some of the most prominent TRIPS requirements are as follows:
Copyright terms must extend to 50 years after the death of the author, although
films and photographs are only required to have fixed 50 and to be at least 25
year terms, respectively; (ii) Copyright must be granted automatically, and not
based upon any “formality”, such as registrations or systems of renewal; (iii)
Computer programs must be regarded as “literary works” under copyright law
and receive the same terms of protection.; (iv) National exceptions to copyright
(such as “fair use” in the United States) are constrained by the Berne three-step
test; (v) Patents must be granted in all “fields of technology,” although
exceptions for certain public interests are allowed and must be enforceable for at
least 20 years; (vi) Exceptions to the exclusive rights must be limited, provided
that a normal exploitation of the work and normal exploitation of the patent is not
in conflict; (vii) No unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right
holders of computer programs and patents is allowed; (viii) Legitimate interests
of third parties have to be taken into account by patent rights; (ix) In each state,
intellectual property laws may not offer any benefits to local citizens which are
not available to citizens of other TRIPS signatories by the principles of national
treatment (with certain limited exceptions).
Id. (roman numerals added).
39
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nations must meet for: copyrights; geographical indications; industrial designs;
integrated circuit layout-designs; patents; monopolies for the developers of new
plant varieties; trademarks; trade dress; and undisclosed or confidential
information. 44 TRIPS also specifies enforcement procedures, remedies, and
dispute resolution procedures. 45 Under TRIPS:
[p]rotection and enforcement of all intellectual property rights shall meet the
objectives to contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 46

The WTO negotiated the TRIPS provision of GATT in an attempt to
facilitate equal treatment among imported and domestic goods through specifying
the legal obligations of member countries regarding intellectual property rights. 47
As a result, TRIPS was heralded as a “landmark step in codifying and harmonizing
international IP law,” 48 as it “introduced intellectual property law into the
international trading system for the first time.” 49 Moreover, TRIPS was
designated the “most detailed and comprehensive multilateral agreement on
intellectual property” based on its far-reaching provisions, 50 and remains the most
comprehensive international agreement on intellectual property to date. 51
TRIPS has been classified as the most wide-reaching international treaty on
the subject of intellectual property, and when fully implemented, will strengthen
international intellectual property rights protection. 52 TRIPS, although full of
benefits, also has several weaknesses with respect to its applicability to protecting
intellectual property rights in the current online marketplace wrought with media
piracy. 53 Professor Marci Hamilton, in her article entitled The TRIPS Agreement:
Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 54 poignantly states that:
44
45
46

Id.
Id.
Wikipedia.org, Agreement on TRIPS, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TRIPS (last visited Mar. 8,

2010).
47

See Monlux, supra note 36, at 143.
Id.
49
See Agreement on TRIPS, supra note 46.
50
See Leong, supra note 11, at 372. Specifically TRIPS:
[I]n a single agreement, [] establishes the minimum standards of protection for
the most important forms of IP [intellectual property] . . . (b) its establishes
standards of enforcement of . . . IP by incorporating commitments regarding
domestic procedures and remedies for enforcement of IP rights, including
establishment of certain general principles applicable to all IP rights enforcement
procedure; and (c) it provides a binding, enforceable dispute settlement
mechanism to resolve disputes regarding [its] members’ compliance with the
established standards.
Id.
51
Agreement on TRIPS, supra note 46.
52
See Monlux, supra note 36, at 144.
53
Id.
54
See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 614-15 (1996) (Professor Marci A. Hamilton holds the Paul R. Verkuil
48
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Despite [TRIPS’s] broad sweep and . . . unstated aspirations, [it] arrives on
the scene already outdated. TRIPS reached fruition at the same time that the
on-line era became irrevocable. Yet it makes no concession, not even a nod,
to the fact that a significant portion of the international intellectual property
market will soon be conducted on-line. This silence could transform a
troubling treaty into a weapon of extortion by the publishing industry, which
has already succeeded in crafting TRIPS as a blunt instrument for copyright
protection . . . TRIPS’ silence threatens to make it both outdated and
overprotective. 55

In light of the current issues under examination, it appears evident that the
current international efforts to combat media piracy are falling short of the Berne
Convention’s requirement to provide strong standards to protect copyright law.
Although world leaders have designated TRIPS as the most comprehensive step
taken towards harmonizing international intellectual property laws, its failure to
address Internet media piracy and the unique challenges faced by countries in
protecting intellectual property rights in the digital age proves that current
international standards do not reach far enough.
B. Modern International Digital Copyright Protection Laws
Several members of WIPO have adopted country specific legislation to
combat the serious and emerging threats of media piracy. Such legislation has
been designed to both codify the WIPO Internet Treaties and adhere to the
minimum standards necessary for nations to comply with GATT, as outlined by
the TRIPS provision. 56 For example, United States copyright law has attempted to
mitigate the issues associated with the modernization of the Internet and
information technology with its adoption of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”). 57
1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act & Beyond
The DMCA is the United States copyright law that codifies the 1996 WIPO
Internet Treaties. 58 It was passed on October 12, 1998 by a unanimous vote in the
United States Senate and signed into law by then President, Bill Clinton, on
October 28, 1998. 59 The DMCA amended Title 17 of the United States Code to
extend the reach of copyright law, while limiting the liability of the providers of

Chair in Public Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, where she is the
founding Director of the Intellectual Property Law Program).
55
Id.
56
See Leong, supra note 11, at 372.
57
See id. at 374-75.
58
Id.
59
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUMMARY OF THE DIGITAL COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998 (Dec. 1998),
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf; WIKIPEDIA.ORG, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT
ACT (“DMCA”); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Millennium_Copyright_Act (last visited Jan. 23,
2010).
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online services for copyright infringement by their users. 60 The DMCA currently
regulates United States copyright law, as its adoption implemented: the WIPO
Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act; the
Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act; the Computer
Maintenance Competition Act; the Vessel Hull Design Protection Act; and
numerous other provisions dealing with modern anti-circumvention laws. 61
The fundamental provisions of the DMCA are “to prohibit anticircumvention technologies and create exemptions for Internet service
providers.” 62 This act criminalizes production and dissemination of technology,
devices, or services intended to circumvent measures (commonly known as digital
rights management or DRM) that control access to copyrighted works. 63 It also
criminalizes the act of circumventing an access control, whether or not actual
copyright infringement has occurred. 64 The act further provides:
[n]o person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that
A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title; B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or C) is marketed by that person or another acting in
concert with that person with that person’s knowledge for use in circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title. 65

In addition, the DMCA heightens the penalties for copyright infringement on
the Internet and was designed to regulate the use of computers as recording,
storage, and distribution devices of digital entertainment content. 66
In more aggressive measures, the United States has attempted to implement
increasingly stringent legislation that would further punish acts of infringement to
include allowing federal prosecutors to file civil lawsuits against infringers. 67
Additionally, the United States has recently endeavored to introduce the Perform
Act, also known as the Platform Equality and Remedies for Rights Holders in
Music Act of 2007. 68
60

Id.
Id.
62
DAVID NIMMER, COPYRIGHT: SACRED TEXT, TECHNOLOGY AND THE DMCA (2003).
63
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2006).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 160.
66
Id.
67
The Protecting Intellectual Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 2004 (“PIRATE Act”)
would have let federal prosecutors file civil lawsuits against suspected infringers. See PIRATE Act, S.
2237, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
108_cong_ bills&docid=f:s2237rfh.txt.pdf.
68
Should this bill become law, it would call for the implementation of DRM protections and
restrictions on digital audio transmissions, such as over the Internet radio, and satellite radio such as
XM Satellite Radio. See Platform Equality and Remedies for Rights Holders in Music Act of 2007
(PERFORM Act), S. 256, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc
.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid =f:s256is.txt.pdf. It would also call for services to be required to
61
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2. European Union Copyright Directive
As a corollary to the United States’ DMCA, the European Union has also
adopted similarly structured legislation to protect the intellectual property of its
citizens. On May 22, 2001, the European Union passed the Copyright Directive,
or EUCD, which addresses some of the same issues as the DMCA. 69 The EUCD
was the European Union’s means of implementing the WIPO Internet Treaties,
having the overall purpose of promoting the “fair balance of rights and interests
between the different categories of rights holders and users of protected subjectmatter” in the digital age. 70
Moreover, in an attempt to remove potential trade barriers, the EUCD
specifically called for the harmonization of the copyright laws of European Union
members. 71 Like the DMCA, the framework of the EUCD incorporated anticircumvention prohibitions to preserve the author’s reproduction and
communication rights. 72 Unlike the DMCA, whose principal innovation was in
the field of copyright law and specifically addressed the exemption of Internet
Service Providers (“ISPs”) from infringement liability, 73 the EUCD “does not
provide broad insulation from liability for ISPs.” 74
Specifically in an attempt to deter Internet music piracy, the European Union
ratified the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in April of
2004. 75 Article 8 76 of the Enforcement Directive states that:
pay “fair market value” for copyrighted materials, as well as amending other laws to make this possible.
Id. In addition, recording devices are barred from disambiguating songs in audio streams. Id.
However, the Act would give consumers the explicit right to make “reasonable” recordings at home, for
their own use, and to transfer those recordings to other computers within their home for playback. Id.
69
See DMCA Summary, supra note 59.
70
See Terese Foged, U.S. v. EU Anti Circumvention Legislation: Preserving the Public’s
Privileges in the Digital Age?, 24(11) E.I.P.R. 525, 535 (2002).
71
Id.
72
See Leong, supra note 11, at 376.
73
See DMCA, supra note 59.
74
Lackman, supra note 34, at 1177.
75
See Enforcement Directive 2004/48, 2004 O.J. (L 157) 45 (EC) [hereinafter Enforcement
Directive]; see also Leong, supra note 11, at 376 (stating that the Enforcement Directive allowed courts
to impose liability on third-party infringers and Internet service providers); see also Press Release, IP
Justice, EU Passes Dangerous IP Law, Despite MEP’s Conflict of Interest “Midnight Knocks” by
Recording Industry Executives Get Go-Ahead, Mar. 9, 2004, http://www.ipjustice.org/CODE/release20
040309_en.shtml.
76
Article 8, §1 of the Enforcement Directive provides in full:
Member States shall ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning an
infringement of an intellectual property right and in response to a justified and
proportionate request of the claimant, the competent judicial authorities may
order that information on the origin and distribution networks of the goods or
services which infringe an intellectual property right be provided by the infringer
and/or any other person who:
(a) was found in possession of the infringing goods on a commercial scale;
(b) was found to be using the infringing services on a commercial scale;
(c) was found to be providing on a commercial scale services used in infringing
activities; or
(d) was indicated by the person referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) as being
involved in the production, manufacture or distribution of the goods or the
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judicial authorities may order the information on the origin and distribution
networks of the goods or services which infringe an intellectual property right . . .
by the infringer and/or any other person who: . . . was found to be providing on a
commercial scale services used in infringing activities. 77

3. DADVSI
France, while a member of the European Union, has established its own
legislation to address the emerging issues of media piracy. 78 DADVSI reformed
French copyright law, and was written primarily to implement the EUCD, which in
turn implemented the 1996 WIPO treaty. 79 DADVSI primarily focused on the
repression of the exchange of copyrighted works over peer-to-peer networks and
the criminalizing of the circumvention of DRM protection measures. 80
Additionally, in order to prevent the unauthorized exchange of copyrighted
material, DADVSI created a criminal cause of action for failing to screen Internet
connections. 81
III. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACTION FOR INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS
In the event of proven copyright infringement, a copyright holder may
request the court to impose third-party liability on a party other than the direct
infringer. 82 Currently under United States law, there are two potential legal
doctrines in which third-parties can be prosecuted as copyright infringers. 83
“Indeed, courts have long recognized that, in order to protect the copyright
holder’s statutory monopoly, parties other than the direct infringer must often be
held accountable for copyright infringements.” 84
Two causes of action for third-party liability recognized in modern case law

provision of the services.
Enforcement Directive, supra note 75.
77
Id.
78
See “Loi sur le Droit d’Auteur et les Droits Voisins dans la Société de l’Information”
(“DADVSI”) [“Law on Authors’ Rights and Related Rights in the Information Society.”] (Aug. 4,
2006) http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/index.asp.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See Code de la propriété intellectuelle, Article L 335-12 (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.legifrance.
gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do;jsessionid=63A46FAE0F679E2D1ACE0496FE9334BF.tpdjo09v_1?cidT
exte=LEGITEXT000006069414&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006279242&dateTexte=20090513&categor
ieLien=id.
82
See Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1320 (D. Mass. 1984).
In this case, song copyright holders sued organizers of a computer trade show for copyright
infringement, based upon the unauthorized performance of copyrighted songs during the trade show and
awards ceremony. Id.
83
While third-party liability for copyright infringement is not expressly stated in the federal
Copyright Act, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he absence of such express language in the
copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability . . . .” Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984). See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 504-05 (2006).
84
Polygram Int’l Publ’g, 855 F. Supp. at 1320 (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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are vicarious liability 85 and contributory copyright infringement. 86 Although the
Copyright Act 87 does not expressly impose liability on anyone other than direct
infringers, courts have long recognized that in certain circumstances, vicarious or
contributory liability will be imposed. 88 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
Studios, Inc., the Court held that “vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all
areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species
of the broader problem of identifying circumstances in which it is just to hold one
individually accountable for the actions of another.” 89 Due to their origins in the
American judicial system and their far-reaching implications in the regulation of
intellectual property rights and copyright infringement, the theories of vicarious
and contributory liability will each be examined in turn.
A. UNITED STATES
1. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
The legal doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement originated in the
Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals. 90 In the 1963 landmark case
of Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., the court examined vicarious
liability for sales of counterfeit recordings. 91 The case developed from a copyright
infringement suit against the owner of a chain of department stores, where a
concessionaire was selling counterfeit recordings. 92 Diverging from the historical
rule of respondeat superior, which imposes liability on an employer for copyright
infringements by an employee, the court in Shapiro fashioned a principle for
enforcing copyrights against a defendant who did not actually employ the direct
infringer, but who derived economic benefit from interests intertwined with those
of the direct infringer. 93

85
When debating the 1976 copyright amendment, Congress was fully cognizant that the existing
Copyright Act had been interpreted as imposing vicarious liability on proprietors of nightclubs and
other establishments for music infringement. See id. See also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 159-60.
(1976). During this time, the Judiciary Committee considered and ultimately denied a proposal to
amend the Act to exempt such proprietors from vicarious liability. Id.
86
See Polygram Int’l Publ’g, 855 F. Supp. at 1320.
87
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-22 (2006).
88
See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435. The Court in Sony concluded that the video device,
while capable of making illegal copies, was also capable of providing consumers with a useful ability to
record and watch programs that they would otherwise miss. Id. at 445-47. This time-shifting capacity
of the Betamax technology allowed the copies that were made for personal home use to fall within the
fair use exception of the Copyright Act. Id. at 454-55. In 2004, relying upon the Supreme Court’s
decision in Sony, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that P2P file-sharing
software, which was used for making illegal copies of files, could also be used for other non-infringing
purposes. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004).
89
Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 435.
90
“The concept of vicarious copyright liability was developed in the Second Circuit as an
outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior.” Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76
F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
91
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963).
92
Id. at 305-06.
93
Id. at 308-09.
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In developing the doctrine of vicarious copyright infringement, the Second
Circuit relied on a line of cases called the “dance hall” cases. 94 In these cases, the
operators of entertainment venues were held liable for infringing performances
when the operator (1) could control the premises and (2) obtained a direct financial
benefit from the audience, who paid to enjoy the infringing performance. 95
Drawing from the rationale of the “dance hall” cases, the court imposed
liability on the storeowner in Shapiro, even though the owner was unaware of the
concessionaire’s infringement. 96 Here the court articulated what has emerged as
the gold-standard for a finding of vicarious liability in the context of copyright
infringement. 97 It held that:
[w]hen the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the absence of
actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired-the purposes of
copyright law may best be effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the
beneficiary of that exploitation. 98

The Shapiro court deemed the imposition of vicarious liability “neither unduly
harsh nor unfair because the store proprietor had the power to cease the conduct of
the concessionaire, and because the proprietor derived an obvious and direct
financial benefit from the infringement.” 99
Later the Second Circuit more succinctly articulated a test for vicarious
liability in which it stated that: “even in the absence of an employer-employee
relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to
supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such
activities.” 100 More recently Judge Keeton has contributed additional color to the
doctrine of vicarious liability for copyright infringement in his opinion in
Polygram International Publishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc. 101 Judge Keeton has
gone further in clarifying the benefit prong of the vicarious liability test, set forth
in Shapiro. 102 Keeton stated that the “crucial question for establishing the benefit
prong of the test for vicarious liability is not the exact amount of the benefit, but
94
See, e.g., Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931); Dreamland Ball
Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).
95
Buck, 283 U.S. at 198-99; Dreamland Ball Room, 36 F.2d at 355.
96
Shapiro, 316 F.2d. at 304.
97
Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1324 (citing Shapiro, 316 F.2d. at 304).
98
Id.
99
Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. Additionally in Shapiro, the court focused on the formal licensing
agreement between the department store and the direct infringer-concessionaire; where the
concessionaire agreed to the terms and conditions of the department store (e.g. observing and obeying
regulations as specified in the licensing/business agreement) and the department store had the right to
police its concessionaire. Id. at 308.
100
Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt. Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). In
Gershwin, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the concert artists’ management
firm, which assisted in organizing the local community concert association and directed artists from
whom it received commissions, was liable to owners of copyrighted music performed at concerts for
license fees that were not paid by the artist or community association. Id. See also 3 MELVILLE
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1204(A), at 1270-72 (1995).
101
See Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc., 855 F. Supp. at 1314.
102
Id. at 1333.
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only whether the defendant derived a benefit from the infringement that was
substantial enough to be considered significant.” 103
Following the Second Circuit’s guidance, the Third Circuit has also averred
through its analysis in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc. 104 that
providing a site or facility for known infringing activity is sufficient to establish
contributory liability. 105
2. Contributory & Inducement Infringement
The second legal doctrine to be examined is contributory copyright
infringement. Contributory infringement is a cause of action that originates in tort
law and is based on the legal tenet that one who directly contributes to another
party’s infringement should be liable. 106 Contributory infringement 107 imposes
liability on a person who knowingly contributes to the infringing conduct of
another, and is often been described as an expansion of enterprise liability. 108
For example, in Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark Fi Records,
Inc., 109 the district court held that an advertising agency which placed noninfringing advertisements for the sale of infringing records, a radio station which
broadcast such advertisements, and a packaging agent which shipped the infringing
records could each be held liable as a “contributory” infringer if it were shown to
have had knowledge, or reason to know, of the infringing nature of the records.
Their potential liability was predicated upon the “common law doctrine that one
who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and severally
liable with the prime tortfeasor.” 110
More recently in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 111 the U.S. Supreme

103

Id.
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986). In Columbia
Pictures, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a videocassette rental business, by renting its
rooms to members of the general public in which they could view performances of copyrighted
videocassettes, violated the producers’ exclusive rights to perform the work publicly. Id.
105
See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 1147 (“[m]erely providing the means
for infringement may be sufficient” to incur contributory copyright liability).
106
See 1 NEIL BOORSTYN, BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 10.06, at 10-21 (1994) (“[i]n other words,
the common law doctrine that one who knowingly participates in or furthers a tortious act is jointly and
severally liable with the prime tortfeasor, is applicable under copyright law”).
107
Contributory infringement is defined as “one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity,
induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another.” Gershwin, 443 F.2d at
1162.
108
See 3 NIMMER § 1204[a], at 1275; Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y.
1988).
104

109

Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y.

1966).
110

Id. at 403.
Grokster, 545 U.S. 513. In Grokster, the unanimous Court held that “one who distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.” Id. at 919. The Court concluded that each defendant clearly and knowingly promoted and
marketed its software with the intent to further the business models employed by similar former
services being challenged in court for facilitating copyright infringement when it advertised and
111
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Court held that manufacturers of information sharing technology could be liable
for copyright infringement if they were aware of, financially benefited from,
participated in, or promoted illegal uses of those devices. 112 Furthermore, the
Court established a third theory of infringement called inducement
infringement. 113 Under the theory of inducement infringement, the Court
integrated the patent law’s rule on inducing infringement and common law’s faultbased liability and derived an inducement rule whereby a court will consider
evidence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement, including
statements or actions directed to promoting infringement. 114
As a corollary to copyright law, United States courts have adopted the
doctrine of contributory trademark infringement. In Hard Rock Cafe, 115 the
Seventh Circuit held that regardless of the lack of proof that the flea market had
actual knowledge of its vendors’ sales of counterfeit Hard Rock Cafe trademarked
merchandise, contributory liability could be imposed if the swap meet was
“willfully blind” 116 to the ongoing violations. 117 The court further observed that
while trademark infringement liability is more narrowly construed than copyright
infringement, it recognizes that a company “is responsible for the torts of those it
permits on its premises ‘knowing or having reason to know that the other is acting
or will act tortiously . . . .’” 118 The Seventh Circuit concluded with stating that
with respect to contributory trademark infringement, “a swap meet can not
disregard its vendors’ blatant trademark infringements with impunity.” 119
expressly communicated to the users of the ability of its software to download copyrighted works. Id.
at 938. Additionally, defendants made no attempt to develop filtering tools or mechanisms to filter or
diminish copyrighted material from users’ downloads, nor did they attempt to impede the sharing of
copyrighted files using their software. Id. at 926. Lastly, the Court noted the value of direct evidence
that the defendants derived financial gains through advertising. Id. at 939. Here the defendants made
money by selling advertising space, whereby the advertisements were directed to the screens of
computer users that employ their software. Id. at 940. Consequently, the more the software was
employed by a user downloading copyrighted files, the more the advertisements were delivered to the
user, resulting in greater revenue for the defendants, thus exhibiting further evidence of inducement and
subsequent financial gain. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See id. Furthermore, the Court pointed to evidence of inducement on the part of Grokster,
which included advertising infringing uses, instructing on how to engage in an infringing use by
providing information that goes beyond a product’s characteristics, demonstrating an affirmative intent
that the product be used to infringe, and actively encouraging such infringement. Id. Furthermore, the
inducement rule premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, whereby mere
knowledge of potential or of actual infringing use and ordinary acts incident to product distribution are
not enough. Id. at 937.
115
Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992). In
this case, the owner of the “Hard Rock” trademark sued the owner and operator of multiple flea markets
on the basis of contributory and vicarious liability for the vendors’ trademark violations and the retail
store for direct liability. Id. The trademark owner sought damages and permanent injunctions against
the flea market owners under the Lanham Trademark Act. Id.
116
Willful blindness as to the counterfeit nature of a mark or designation is sufficient to trigger
mandatory provisions requiring an award of treble damages and attorney fees to the prevailing party in
a trademark infringement action. See Lanham Trademark Act, §§ 32, 35 (a)-(b), 43 (1946) (codified as
amended at, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114, 1117(a)-(b), 1125 (2010)).
117
Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149.
118
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) & cmt. d (1979)).
119
Id.
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As evinced from the robust body of law discussed above, it is incontestable
that the United States is slowly dredging forward towards the establishment of
effective civil law aimed at combating copyright infringement and media piracy.
While United States courts have been innovative in their utilization and integration
of legal doctrines from other areas of intellectual property law, melioration is still
needed as the courts seek to establish a more stringent body of copyright common
law.
B. EUROPEAN UNION
1. France
The international media industry has watched closely as France has worked
to approve and implement its famed High Authority for Copyright Protection and
Dissemination of Works on the Internet (“HADOPI”) Law. 120 The HADOPI Law,
if adopted as originally proposed, would have given ISPs the power to block access
to the Internet for anyone accused three times of illegal file-sharing. 121 Moreover,
under the initial bill, the HADOPI organization would have received complaints
from authorized representatives of the entertainment industry, and would have
The HADOPI
tracked down offenders with the cooperation of ISPs. 122
organization would have also had the authority to obtain any and all identification
information and personal data about the infringers from ISPs without any prior
judicial procedure. 123 Additionally, the organization would have been tasked with
protecting “copyrighted content over the Internet, promot[ing] the development of
legal downloads of such content, and oversee[ing] [Digital Rights Management]
and identification measures.” 124 However, despite strong support by French
President Nicholas Sarkozy, the bill was rejected in its original form. 125
Although the bill was ultimately adopted in May 2009 by both the French
National Assembly and the French Senate, 126 on June 10, 2009 the French
Constitutional Council declared the main part of the bill unconstitutional and

120
The HADOPI law or “Creation and Internet Law” are the nicknames for the French law
officially titled “Loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur Internet” or “law favoring
the distribution and protection of creative works on the Internet,” regulating and controlling the usage
of the Internet in order to enforce compliance to the copyright law. See High Authority for Copyright
Protection and Dissemination of Works on the Internet (“HADOPI”) (2009),
http://www.senat.fr/dossierleg/ pjl07-405.html. The government organization charged with monitoring
Internet users’ compliance with the bill is also named the High Authority for Copyright Protection and
Dissemination of Works on the Internet. See Gunn, infra note 121.
121
See Angela Gunn, French Assembly Passes ‘Three Strikes’ HADOPI Law, BETANEWS: POL. &
L. NEWS, May 12, 2009, http://www.betanews.com/article/French-Assembly-passes-three-strikesHADOPI-law/1242172150.
122
See Szuskin, infra note 127, at 3.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
French Reject Internet Piracy Law, BBC NEWS.COM, Apr. 9, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/7992262.stm (Oct. 23, 2010).
126
See Lawmakers Adopt Internet Anti-Piracy Bill, FRANCE24.COM, May 13, 2009, http://www.
france24.com/en/20090512-lawmakers-adopt-internet-anti-piracy-bill-illegal-downloading-France.
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removed several controversial provisions. 127 As originally proposed, HADOPI
would have allowed sanctions to be issued against Internet users simply accused of
infringement as opposed to only those convicted of infringement. 128 The French
Constitutional Council found that because “the Internet is a component of the
freedom of expression” and “in French law the presumption of innocence
prevails,” only a judge can impose sanctions under the law. 129 As a result, on
October 22, 2009, a revised version of HADOPI was approved, which mandated
judicial review prior to revoking a user’s Internet access. 130 As currently enacted
France’s HADOPI law, 131 in addition to creating punishments for both civil and
criminal counterfeiting, establishes a novel approach to combating online piracy by
holding users of an Internet access point directly responsible for any improper
use. 132
2. United Kingdom
Until early 2010, the United Kingdom’s position on copyright infringement
was “governed by the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1998 (“CDPA”), [which]
regulate[d] copyright and design rights and provide[d] criminal sanctions for
infringement.” 133 England recently adopted a more robust solution to the issue of
media piracy in the form of the Digital Economy Act. 134 The Digital Economy
Energy Bill was first announced in the Queen’s 2009 speech before the U.K.
Parliament. 135 In her address, the Queen stated that “[the] Government [would]
introduce a Bill to ensure the communications infrastructure is fit for the digital
age, supports future economic growth, delivers competitive communications and
enhances public service broadcasting.”136
The main focus of the Digital Economy Act is tackling online copyright

127
See Laurent Szuskin et al., Beyond Counterfeiting: The Expanding Battle Against Online
Piracy, 1 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2009). See also Top Legal Body Strikes Down Anti-Piracy
Law, FRANCE24.COM, Nov. 23, 2009, http://www.france24.com/en/20090610-top-legal-body-strikes
down-anti-piracy-law-hadopi-constitutional-council-internet-france. The Council found that the law
violated the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, particularly the presumption of
innocence, freedom of speech, and separation of powers. Id.
128
See FRANCE24.COM, supra note 127.
129
Id.
130
Eric Pfanner, France Approves Wide Crackdown on Net Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/technology/23net.html?_r=1.
131
The law underlying the HADOPI is derived from the new Article L.336-3 of the French
intellectual property code (“IPC”). See Szuskin, supra note 127, at 3. Under this provision of the IPC,
Internet users have a duty to prevent their Internet access from being used as a means to share (via
download, upload, stream, or otherwise making available to others) contents protected by copyright
without the authorization of the rights holders. Id.
132
Id. at 2.
133
Id. at 6.
134
See Digital Economy Act 2010, available at http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx
?activeTextDocId=3699621(last revised Oct. 29, 2010).
135
See Queen Elizabeth II of U.K., Speech at Meeting of the House of Lords (Nov. 18, 2009)
(transcript
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/911180001.htm#09111813000012).
136
Id.
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infringement through a two-stage process. 137 The first stage is designed to
establish a system of laws aimed to simplify the tracking and prosecution of
persistent infringers. 138 The second stage comprises the government using its
reserve powers to introduce technical measures and anti-infringement initiatives,
such as blocking access to Internet locations. 139 Under the current version of the
Digital Economy Act, with appropriate consent the Secretary of State can block
access to a location on the Internet “from which a substantial amount of material
has been, is being or is likely to be made available in infringement of copyright,”
or a location which “facilitates” infringing behavior. 140
U.K. copyright holders were previously pressuring Parliament to enact
legislation that would require ISPs to act in the role of “copyright police.” 141 In
response, the current legislation requires ISPs to assume responsibility for
identifying and preventing infringement by their network subscribers. 142 The
statutory basis to support such legislation was granted in Section 97A of the
CDPA, which states that “the High Court can grant an injunction against a service
provider that has ‘actual knowledge’ of another person’s using their service to
infringe copyright.” 143 Thus, the Digital Economy Act again codifies the High
Court’s power to issue injunctions; however, it requires additional conditions to be
met before an injunction can be requested. 144
3. Germany
Germany currently has no similar legislation to that of France or England. 145
Additionally, there is no pending legislation or governmental initiatives
comparable to the HADOPI Law or the Digital Economy Act. 146 In a 2008 report,
the German government advocated for the development of cooperative approaches
between intellectual property rights holders and ISPs. 147 The German government
has been reluctant to adopt the methods suggested by HADOPI Law because it
includes the transfer of personal data of Internet users. 148 The German
Constitutional Court has recently developed regulations which would require any
personal data collected from Internet users to be reconciled with the court’s
creation of the secrecy of telecommunications, the right of informational selfdetermination, and the fundamental right to the guarantee of the confidentiality and

137
See Queen Elizabeth II, Digital Economy Bill Address (Nov. 18, 2009), (available at http://
www.number10.gov.uk/Page21348).
138
Digital Economy Act, supra note 134, § 10.
139
Id. § 17.
140
Id.
141
See Szuskin, supra note 127, at 6.
142
Id. See also Digital Economy Act, supra note 134, §§ 3, 4, 16.
143
See Szuskin, supra note 127, at 6.
144
Digital Economy Act, supra note 134, § 17.
145
See Szuskin, supra note 127, at 8.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
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integrity of information technology systems. 149
Under German law, ISPs are not responsible for illegal information that they
transfer or store for their users if they do not know about the illegal acts and they
immediately remove the information or lock the user’s access as soon as they learn
about the infringement. 150 German court practices however are inconsistent and
some courts hold ISPs responsible for copyright infringements with regard to
online piracy. 151
4. Sweden
In recent years, Sweden has received “notoriety as a piracy safe haven” and a
rogue nation with respect to illegal file-sharing, which stands in stark contrast to
the nation’s general reputation as a model society. 152 This article briefly
addresses Sweden’s legal position on copyright protection and media piracy based
on the unique factors that have contributed to the country becoming a hotbed for
Internet piracy. Because Sweden is typically one of the world’s earliest adopters
of new technologies, Internet file-sharing and media piracy caught on early. 153
By the time any actions were taken against illegal file-sharing, the practice
had already become deeply entrenched in Sweden’s technological culture. 154
Pirate Bay and Kazaa are two of the most prominent and popular file-sharing sites
on the Internet, and both Pirate Bay and Kazaa originated in Sweden. 155
Accordingly, the highest-profile Swedish file-sharing case was not against an
individual user, but against the BitTorrent site Pirate Bay. 156 The site had been a
long-time target of the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) and
major Hollywood studios for its facilitation of media piracy. 157 Pirate Bay had
gained worldwide notoriety by openly embracing piracy and mocking threats of
legal actions by posting complaints and cease-and-desist letters on its website. 158
Additionally, “Sweden has faster broadband with deeper penetration than
just about anywhere in the world. That, combined with the techno-friendly attitude
that pervades Scandinavia and a government slow to take any kind of action,

149

Id. at 9.
See Szuskin, supra note 127, at 9.
151
Id.
152
See, e.g., David Brooks, Op-Ed: The Culture of Nations, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 2006, available
at http://select.nytimes.com/2006/08/13/opinion/13brooks.html?n=Top/Opinion/Editorials% 20and%20
Op-Ed/Op-Ed?Columnists/David%20Brooks. In fact, Sweden has often been held up as a model
society. The British newspaper, The Guardian proclaimed Sweden to be “[t]he most successful society
the world has ever known.” See Polly Toynbee, Comment, The Most Successful Society the World has
Ever Known, GUARDIAN (U.K), Oct. 25, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/
Column/0,,1599939,00.html.
153
Ulric M. Lewen, Internet File-Sharing: Swedish Pirates Challenge the U.S., 16 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 173, 192 (2008).
154
Id. at 187-88, 192.
155
Id. at 174.
156
Id. at 187-88.
157
Id.
158
See Lewen, supra note 153, at 187-88.
150
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allowed file-sharing to root deeply in practice and popular culture.” 159 Arguably,
the most contributing factor to the rate of media piracy in Sweden is the fact that,
until July 1, 2005 when Parliament amended the Swedish Copyright Act, 160
downloading copyrighted material for private use was not explicitly illegal in
Sweden. 161 However, uploading copyrighted material without permission was
previously prohibited. 162
Sweden’s Department of Justice, under the guidance of the European
Union’s Enforcement Directive, 163 is again debating whether the Directive’s
language grants intellectual property rights organizations the right to petition a
court to order ISPs to reveal the names of alleged infringers. 164 Originally,
Sweden chose not to adopt any provisions requiring ISPs to reveal to copyright
holders the identities of suspected infringers, citing privacy concerns.165 If
Swedish lawmakers ultimately find that the Enforcement Directive reads on the

159
Id. at 192 (quoting Quinn Norton, A Nation Divided Over Piracy, WIRED, Aug. 17 2006,
http://wired.com/news/culture/0,71544-0.html).
160
See Ann Harrison, The Pirate Bay: Here to Stay?, WIRED, Mar. 13, 2006, http://www.wired.
com/science/ discoveries/news/2006/03/70358 (discussing how Pirate Bay has eluded the MPAA’s
crackdown on peer-to-peer sites); see also Proposition [Prop.] 2004/05:110 Upphovsrätten i
informationsamhället--genomförande av direktiv 2001/29/EG, m.m. [government bill] (Swed.),
available at http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108/a/40699.
161
“The amended Copyright Act made it illegal to download pirated material or any other posted
material without the permission of the copyright owner.” See Lewen, supra note 153, at 184 (2008); see
also 2 ch. 12 § Lag om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk [Act on Copyright in Literary and
Artistic Works] (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 1960:729) (Swed.), translated in http://www.
sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/01/51/95/69b07709.pdf [hereinafter Swedish Copyright Act] (“Anybody is
entitled to make, for private purposes, one or a few copies of works that have been made public. As
regards to literary works in written form the making of copies may, however concern only limited parts
of works, or such works of limited scope. The copies must not be used for purposes other than private
use . . . . This Article does not confer a right to make copies of a work when the copy that constitutes
the master copy has been prepared or has been made available to the public in violation of Article 2.”);
SWEDISH MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, A Brief Overview of the Swedish Copyright System 13 (2006),
http://www. sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/05/67/65/ac3af6b4.pdf.
162
Id.
163
The European Union’s Enforcement Directive that prompted the amendment of the Swedish
Copyright Act of 2005 provides language that can be interpreted as giving Internet Service Providers
more direct responsibility for what their customers disseminate online. See Enforcement Directive,
supra note 75. Article 8, §1 of the Enforcement Directive provides that:
Member States shall ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning an
infringement of an intellectual property right and in response to a justified and
proportionate request of the claimant, the competent judicial authorities may
order that information on the origin and distribution networks of the goods or
services which infringe an intellectual property right be provided by the infringer
and/or any other person who:
(a) was found in possession of the infringing goods on a commercial scale;
(b) was found to be using the infringing services on a commercial scale;
(c) was found to be providing on a commercial scale services used in infringing
activities; or
(d) was indicated by the person referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) as being
involved in the production, manufacture or distribution of the goods or the
provision of the services.
Id.
164
Lewen, supra note 153, at 186-87.
165
Id. at 185-86.
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duty of ISPs, such a change would bring current Swedish copyright law further in
line with United States, French, and British copyright laws. 166 The “commercial
scale” provision of the Enforcement Directive would likely prevent ISPs from
providing information on non-commercial file-sharers. 167 Thus, the vast majority
of media pirates who illegally download media for personal pleasure would be
exempt from the long-arm of the Enforcement Directive. 168
IV. SAFE HARBOR? WHY?
Currently, United States federal law creates a conditional safe harbor for
Online service providers (“OSPs”), including Internet service providers and other
Internet intermediaries by shielding them from liability for the infringing acts of
The Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act
others. 169
(“OCILLA”) was passed as a part of the 1998 DMCA. 170 OCILLA is sometimes
referred to as the “safe harbor” provision or as “DMCA 512” because it added §
512 to Title 17 of the United States Code. 171 By exempting Internet intermediaries
from copyright infringement liability (provided they follow certain rules),
OCILLA attempts to strike a balance between the competing interests of copyright
owners and digital users. 172 OCILLA allows OSPs to avoid liability, provided

166

Id. at 175.
Sweden receives the highest per capita amount in the world from receipts of
royalties and license fees . . . . In fact, Sweden is the third largest exporter of
music in the world, after the United States and the United Kingdom. Thus, both
Sweden and the United States benefit economically from intellectual property
rights and have similar interests in protecting such rights.
Id.
167
Id. at 187.
168
Id.
169
See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or . . . for injunctive or
other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider’s
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system or
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the
intermediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such
transmitting, routing, or providing connections, if-- (1) the transmission of the
material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other than the service
provider; (2) the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is
carried out through an automatic technical process without selection of the
material by the service provider; (3) the service provider does not select the
recipients of the material except as an automatic response to the request of
another person; (4) no copy of the material made by the service provider in the
course of such intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or
network in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated
recipients, and no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner
ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than is
reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of connections;
and (5) the material is transmitted through the system or network without
modification of its content.
Id.
170
171
172

Id.
See § (512)(a) (2006).
See id.
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they comply with the terms of the statute, regardless of the validity of any claim of
infringement. 173
More simply put, to qualify for “safe harbor” protection under § 512, the
OSP must not have actual knowledge that it is hosting infringing material or be
aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. 174 It is
clear from the statute and legislative history that an OSP has no duty to monitor its
service or affirmatively seek infringing material on its system. 175 The statute,
however, describes two ways in which an OSP can be put on notice of infringing
material on its system: 1) notice from the copyright owner, and 2) the existence of
“red flags.” 176
The entertainment industry has expressed increasing displeasure with the
safe harbor provisions for ISPs and their resistance of assisting in piracy control;
thus industry heads have proposed modifications to § 512 and the DMCA. 177 In
the past few years, Senator John McCain, head of the Senate Commerce
Committee, announced that hearings would be held to evaluate further “legal
dispute[] between the [Recording Industry Association of America] and Internet
providers over copyright protection.” 178 Concerned about the implications for
copyright infringement and privacy of subscribers, the Commerce Committee
hearings will be an early test of the entertainment industry’s continued clout on
Capitol Hill.
V. WHAT’S NEXT?
The inability to control the widespread distribution of digital information
over the Internet is a daunting challenge for the entertainment industry. Although
many businesses have exerted immense efforts to develop techniques for
encryption, water marking, 179 and other safety technologies which would prevent
173

Id.
See § (512)(c) (2006).
175
See id.
176
See id.
177
See Tratos, supra note 4, at 223-24.
178
Id.
The United States faces a threat to the measures already imposed under the
DMCA; courts have been hearing arguments that the DMCA violates due
process, fair use, and First Amendment protections; and new bills have been
introduced in the House of Representatives that try to address the overinclusiveness of the DMCA. If the DMCA is rewritten, the European Union, in
the interest of harmonization, would probably have to follow suit by revising the
Copyright Directive. Otherwise, U.S. citizens could be sued in another country
for a use that is considered fair in the United States, thus potentially dismantling
WIPO’s ideals in encouraging member states to agree to its treaties in the first
place.
See Lackman, supra note 34, at 1206.
179
Digital watermarking technology alters content to such a minute degree that the mark itself is
imperceptible to the human eye or ear. However, the embedded metadata becomes inextricably
interwoven with the content so that the deletion of the metadata either materially degrades the quality of
the content or even renders the content useless. See STEFAN KATZENBEISSER & FABIEN A.
PETITCOLAS, INFORMATION HIDING TECHNIQUES FOR STEGANOGRAPHY AND DIGITAL
WATERMARKING (2000).
174
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the unauthorized use, copying, and distribution of digital content, none of these
technologies have yet proven effective. 180 Additionally:
because the Internet knows no state or country boundaries, the laws of states and
countries other than the physical location of the Internet publisher or broadcaster
may apply, particularly where the intended audience or market exists in a locale
other than the location where the materials are being placed onto the Internet. 181

The United States’ entertainment industry is currently seeking more effective
measures to protect their intellectual property interests. The industry has
continuously encouraged lawmakers to reject Internet neutrality laws such as
OCCILLA and its safe harbor provision, and instead has sought to advance laws
requiring ISPs to police their networks for infringing works. 182 On April 6, 2009,
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives held a hearing
on global copyright piracy. 183 During this hearing, Congressman Howard L.
Berman, Committee Chair, stated that he would soon introduce legislation that
would begin to elevate the attention given to intellectual property concerns
abroad. 184 Berman further stated that, “[i]ntellectual property protection is an
economic stimulus . . . [and t]o help boost our economy, it is imperative that we
take measures to ensure American innovations are protected abroad and artistic
communities can earn a return on their investment in new creative expression.” 185
Numerous alternative solutions have been proposed for the international
community to compensate and/ or further protect the rights of copyright holders.
One of the most commonly discussed solutions is to impose a levy or tax to
compensate copyright holders for lost revenues resulting from media piracy. 186 It
has been proposed that such a levy could be collected in a manner similar to the
television license fees currently imposed by several European countries. 187
Suggestions have also been made to enact levies on broadband connections and/or
taxes on ISPs. 188 Under this collective licensing scheme, monies collected though
such levies and/or taxes would be distributed to the rights holders, by
proportioning the collected fees based upon popularity of the pirated works.189
Collective societies 190 and/or similar trade associations would be responsible for
180

These methods are collectively referred to as Digital Rights Management.
See Tratos, supra note 4, at 217.
182
See Anne Broache, MPAA Wants ISP Help in Online Piracy Fight, CNET NEWS, Sept. 18,
2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9780401-7.html.
183
FOREIGNAFFAIRS.HOUSE.GOV, Committee on Foreign Affairs, At Foreign Affairs Committee
Field Hearing, Berman Launches New Initiative to Fight Global Intellectual Property Theft, (Apr. 6,
2009), http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=608.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Lewen, supra note 153, at 197-98 (citing Ivar Ekman, Politicians Smell Votes in Sweden’s Filesharing Debate, INT’L HERALD TRIB., (June 18, 2006), http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/18/
business/levies .php (discussing efforts in France to impose such a levy in order to legalize filesharing)).
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
In a similar manner, organizations such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC were created by artists to
181
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administering the distribution of the money collected from the tax to the copyright
holders. Similarly, both the United States and Sweden already impose a levy on
blank recording media under the Swedish Copyright Act and the United States
Audio Home Recording Act 191 in order to allow copyright holders compensation
for legal copying. 192 Further suggestions have been made that the levies on
recordable media could either be increased or combined with taxes on broadband
connections. 193 One pitfall to collective licensing schemes is that in attempts to
compensate rights holders for piracy, Internet access could become prohibitively
expensive. 194
Another potential solution would be to follow the European Union’s
mandate, which requires online music providers to obtain licenses from record
labels and collecting societies that represent authors and songwriters, as a
condition of their operation in the EU market. 195 The EU Commission is currently
contemplating a “music licensing framework that would give right holders the
choice to authorize one single collecting society to license and monitor all the
different uses made of their works across the twenty-five EU member states.” 196
While each of these suggestions would likely curb the current levels of Internet
media piracy, it is unlikely that any of the nations mentioned in this paper will
address these issues in the near future, in light of the current global economy.
VI. CONCLUSION
While there have been numerous efforts to combat media piracy, the current
international laws do not reach far enough to protect the rights of the entertainment

collect royalties from radio stations in the early twentieth century, thus creating a voluntary collective
licensing system. Id. at 199. Under this system “songwriters and copyright owners grant to
performance rights societies a license to sublicense the rendition of public performances of their
musical works.” AL KOHN ET AL., KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 961 (3d ed. 1996).
191
In 1992, the United States passed the Audio Home Recording Act (“AHRA”), which required
the manufacturers of digital audio tapes, digital compact cassettes, mini-discs, and other audio recorders
and recordable media to make royalty payments to the music industry and its subsequent rights holders.
See Tratos, supra note 4, at 159-60; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006). Under the AHRA, royalty
payments are to be deposited with the United States Copyright Office from both manufacturers and
importers of digital recorders and from companies that produced the blank media on which recordings
were made. See Tratos, supra note 4, at 159-60; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006). The Copyright
Office then holds the deposited sums in two separate funds: the Sound Recordings Fund and the
Musical Works Fund. These funds hold portions of the royalties allocated for distribution to artists and
the sound recording copyright holders, in addition to distribution to songwriters and publishers. See
Tratos, supra note 4, at 159-60; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006). The Copyright Office administers
the distribution of royalties to the individual claimants on a yearly basis. See Tratos, supra note 4, at
159-60; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003 (2006). The AHRA further prohibits the import or manufacture of
digital audio recording devices or digital audio recording mediums unless applicable royalty payments
are made for each device manufactured. See Tratos, supra note 4, at 159-60; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1003
(2006).
192
See Lewen, supra note 153, at 198. See also Lewis Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The
Audio Home Recording Act and the Formation of Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
497, 500–01 (1998).
193
See Lewen, supra note 153, at 199.
194
Id. at 199-200.
195
See Leong, supra note 11, at 390.
196
Id. at 391.
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industry from media piracy. Unless more stringent laws are enacted or safe harbor
provisions for ISP’s are removed as in the current United States law, the
entertainment industry will remain in financial jeopardy. Although the Berne
Convention, TRIPS, and the WIPO Internet Treaties have all aimed to harmonize
copyright law, it is evident from the extensive survey of the international
intellectual property laws provided above that the global community is far from
worldwide harmonization of copyright standards.
Today international media piracy is rampant on the Internet and suggests that
the current measures employed by the United States and the European Union are
ineffective and insufficient in protecting copyright holders against copyright
infringement. As a result, the United States and global entertainment industry have
suffered irreparable harm that will go un-remedied unless copyright laws are both
strengthened and harmonized. “Unfortunately, the incentives and profits for
engaging in piracy are high, and the risks of being apprehended and sanctioned are
low in many countries around the world. Piracy of copyrighted materials is not a
victimless crime and its global repercussions must be addressed.” 197
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, supra note 183.

